We are searching data for your request:
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.
By Gian Carlo Delgado Ramos
From a review of the geoeconomics and geopolitics of water, this text seeks to account for the tendency of the liquid to increasingly transform itself into a strategic resource of multiple uses and with it of multiple modes of exploitation of surplus value.
From a review of the geoeconomics and geopolitics of water, this text seeks to account for the tendency of the liquid to increasingly transform itself into a strategic resource of multiple uses and with it of multiple modes of exploitation of surplus value. The case to be reviewed is the South American one, a region that concentrates more than a fifth of the world's fresh water reserves and that aims to integrate, without seriously and carefully considering the ecological and social impacts, a series of schemes of "water corridors "as a counterpart to the development corridors officially proposed by the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America project (IIRSA).
For this purpose, a review of the link between the location of what is known as "development corridors" and the role that water would play to satisfy the diverse needs of these corridors, ranging from direct human consumption, the agricultural and industrial, as a generator of electricity, as a means of transport, and so on. The case to be reviewed is the South American one, a region that concentrates more than a fifth of the world's fresh water reserves and that aims to integrate, without seriously and carefully considering the ecological and social impacts, a series of schemes of "water corridors "The idea of an infrastructure corridor is quite old, however, in" modern "terms, perhaps the case most attached to such a conception is the American project of the transcontinental railroad of the 19th century and that had as its aim the expansion towards the Pacific to occupy new lands. The "package" included a "development program" since as the railroad advanced, and later when water was taken to the arid lands of the west or the Great American Desert (1), cities, industrial, agricultural, cultural centers were located , etc. All by way of a great "development corridor" in which the social and ecological costs of US territorial expansion were staggering. The massacre of millions of indigenous people, the theft and looting of their lands, or shortly thereafter, the flooding of lands for the construction of dams, -among other "images" -, have been a constant in the history of the northern power ( 2).
However, the "development corridors", hereinafter referred to as corridors, have a clear foundation in the location of a set of infrastructures that make them possible, with which they take shape and form in the geographical space. I mean infrastructure corridors.
The differentiation is important to realize that without the existence of an infrastructure corridor, one cannot speak of a corridor, however, when speaking of a corridor, at the same time it is referring to the infrastructure that makes it possible.
Corridors (and their respective infrastructure corridors) in recent centuries have proven to be the most efficient figure -in capitalist terms- for territorial occupation (territorial reorganization), the transport and trade of goods by land and water, the development of the large-scale industry and agriculture, the stimulation of multinational inspiration tourism areas, and so on. That is why the corridors should be seen as strategic development routes of several kilometers wide in which areas of intensive production, extraction of natural resources, media, urban locations are located, among other factors.
Roughly, the nodal composition of a corridor consists of: 1) Means of Transport to move raw materials and merchandise (sea ports -for example on the Atlantic and Pacific sides- and other means that vary according to the territorial composition allows it : water canals, high-speed railways, highways, etc.); 2) Energy to make corridors functional, and above all to move production systems: oil, gas and electricity (nuclear, thermoelectric / geothermal, hydroelectric plants, electrical lines and interconnection, gas / oil pipelines, etc.); 3) Water for productive activities (dams, transfers, aqueducts, pumping, distribution and treatment systems, etc. - include the generation of hydroelectricity) (3); and 4) Telecommunications that integrate the region in real time, both within the corridor, with other corridors and in general with the exterior (fiber optics and location of communication centers with state-of-the-art technology). See Table A.
This schematization is widely known and its implementation in the American hemisphere is a current issue, in Mesoamerica with the Puebla Panama Plan (4) and, in South America with the IIRSA (see below).
It is worth clarifying that in general the designs are only general outlines and the specifications are handled at the regional, national and local level. These are always subject to modifications, not only technical, but also those that respond to their re-functionalization in search of the best options that may arise to stimulate capital accumulation in favor of the main economic power groups in this or that region. In addition, its degree of uncertainty is considerable both due to its financial feasibility and unexpected technological and technical limitations (biogeophysical characteristics of the territories, among other factors), as well as because of the political and social conditions (in our case of study both those within States United as those present in the Latin American territorial space).
In their case, the implementation is progressive and does not always appear as a "package", but as a series of isolated projects of various dimensions. On other occasions, projects can be identified that were not previously considered but that have been the consequence of new particular needs of the upper echelons of power and of inter-capitalist competition, and others are the result of the contradiction of local, national, regional or world capitalist interests. ; both from a given historical moment. Therefore, not all infrastructure projects are always part of a larger scheme, say corridors, although they may well be integrated and subsequently adapted to those.
Scenarios of development corridors and their water corridors in Latin America
In America, there are three regions of water scenarios and megaprojects that can be identified and that respond to the location of corridors (see Map 1). North of the Rio Grande, the corridors of the eastern United States stand out - totally linked to the Mississippi - and those of some regions of the west of that country (particularly California). In order to satisfy the water demands of the aforementioned corridors, in addition to those of others located in southern Canada and northern Mexico, the North American Water and Power Plan (NAWAPA) (5) has been designed since the mid-20th century. Its potential return in the face of an acute water crisis in the US is not something out of the question (6). In Mexico and Central America, the development of multiple corridors (seven in Mexico according to the National Urban Development Program 1995-2000 (7)) has been insistently promoted. Its latest version is the so-called Puebla Panama Plan (PPP) which has as its water counterpart what I have described on another occasion as the Aquarium Scenario and which has as its heart the hydroelectric system of the Usumacinta basin (Mexico-Guatemala) (8). Finally, the South American context is shaped by the seven land corridors and two waterways that make up the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) system. The movements of water there, especially are centered on the tributaries of the Plata / Paraná / Paraguay-Guaporé rivers (where a waterway corridor is located that goes from south to north); the Amazon / Putumayo; and the Negro-Orinoco River (the last two make up a corridor from east to west connecting Macapa and Belem on the Atlantic, with Saramerisa / Yurimaguas in Peru and with Puerto El Carmen in Ecuador, all with land connections to the Pacific). In addition, the focus of attention is the potential of the Guaraní aquifer, the largest fresh underground water reserve in the world and which is emerging as the hydric pivot of the "strong" productive region of Mercosur.
Let's look at the particular case of South America, its plans for mega water projects and its "connection" with the corridors designed for that region.
South American Strategic Water Reserves and IIRSA
In South America, the natural wealth is amazing. It is the first terrestrial biotic reserve on the planet and the second marine; stores about 25% of the world's fresh water; in addition to having large oil deposits in Venezuela (about 70% of hemispheric reserves (9)); gas in Peru and Bolivia; or from different minerals throughout the region; among other examples.
As has been pointed out, the most important water axes are the tributaries of the Plata / Paraná / Paraguay-Guaporé rivers; the Amazon / Putumayo; and the Negro-Orinoco river. Likewise, among other surface water reserves of considerable importance and which are pertinent to mention, are those located in Patagonia between the Mayo River and the Gallegos River. To these are added the immense underground deposits of the liquid that make up what is known as the Guaraní Aquifer, to mention the most important in the region and which is recognized as the largest aquifer in the world with an area of around 1,190,000 km2 (largest surface than those of Spain, France and Portugal together). The water reservoir covers an area, in Brazil, of approximately 850 thousand km2 (9.9% of the territory), in Argentina 225 thousand km2 (7.8%), in Paraguay 70 thousand km2 (17.2%), and in Uruguay 45 thousand km2 ( 25.5%).
As can be imagined, its importance is vital for the series of development corridors that it seeks to consolidate there (Map 2). It is not by chance that the strongest production center in South America, according to the IIRSA designs, is precisely the area where the aquifer extends, a geographical point that has a direct outlet through the Atlantic to the west and communicates with what It is intended to be the Paraná-Paraguay waterway (a means of transport regulated by several dams that are already beginning to be financed by the World Bank and the IDB -eg, Corpus, Yacyretá (10) - and that, "although" they would damage the Pantanal ecosystem , its realization could lead to not only industrial production, but also agricultural production -particularly of conventional and genetically modified soybeans that are produced there by multinationals such as Cargill- in an area that extends from Cáceres in Argentina, to Mato Grosso in Brazil, and even Nueva Palmira in Uruguay) (11).
In this scenario of land management, the aquifer is outlined as strategic, hence the World Bank and the governments of the countries that make up MERCOSUR launched the project for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development of the Guaraní Aquifer System.
What is striking, although not surprising, is that it is a program designed by the "experts" of the World Bank in conjunction with their "local counterparts" who work subordinately according to the typical Bank guidelines contained in their operating manuals (12). To which is added the "detail" that it is financed by that "international" organization, by the Governments of Holland (Bank Netherlands Water Partnership Program) and Germany (German Geological Survey), by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization of American States (based in Washington).
According to WB News Release No. 2003/371-LAC, "? The $ 27.24 million from the Guaraní Aquifer System Project, which includes a grant from the World Wildlife Fund [Gef] of $ 13.4 million, will serve ? to jointly develop and implement an institutional and technical framework for the management and preservation of the Aquifer. " A water reserve that is occasionally recognized by the Bank in that same document as: "? A strategic drinking water resource in the Southern Cone." (13)
Among the 7 components of the Project, described in the base document of the World Bank (14), it is worth highlighting: (i) the expansion and consolidation of scientific knowledge about the Aquifer based on the "development and integration" of the SISAG - Guaraní Aquifer System; (ii) the joint development and implementation of a regulatory framework for aquifer management; as well as the (vi) consideration of the geothermal potential for the generation of electrical energy.
Now, it is worth clarifying what the World Bank usually understands by "management regulatory framework" or "institutional strengthening" process in its projects related to natural resources (talk, for example, of biodiversity or water). Generally, it refers to all those measures that have to be taken to homogenize the legal and operational guidelines for access to such or such resources (of course, under the argument that it is a necessary prerequisite to carry out their "conservation", their "use sustainable ", etc.) (15). In this sense, of the 4 years that initially make up the Guaraní Aquifer project, the first 3 are focused on that purpose, or as the World Bank points out, on the "first phase" that, once consolidated, the next step (or phase) would be to place certain actors in the management and usufruct of the liquid.
This is the typical modus operandi of the Bank, which, in this type of project, reveals its interest, first, in reconfiguring watershed management and, second, in the transfer of water services to the private sector (16). In other words, on the one hand, it promotes a concentration of watershed management in the hands of "select actors" (such as its conservation NGOs; eg, Conservation International) and, once consolidated, seeks, on the other hand, to place multinationals of creditors in the center of the management and usufruct of fresh water (that is, in the water services businesses of storage, distribution, purification, thermo generation and hydroelectricity, etc.).
This process of private usufruct of water, which is consolidated through partial or total concessions (a pretext that is used to say that then it is not a question of privatization, meaning "total sale"), has been concentrated mainly in the hands of multinationals such as Bechtel Co., the French Suez / ONDEO division - formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux - and Vivendi, or the English Thames Water, among others. It is a process that has only been possible after governments are abandoning control of national water sources by participating in trade agreements or arrangements like WTO (17) or NAFTA (the latter in the case of North America), from which they endorse the "transfer" of the management of water resources to private initiative (in this context, in the case of the Guaraní aquifer, it is not that the aquifer itself is sold - although wells can be privatized / concessioned, hydroelectric or geothermal-, but rather the business that can be done with the water extracted from there).
The pro-privatization / concession arguments are already well known and somewhat worn. They subscribe to the urgent need to improve the poor service provided by the parastatals "and the" absence of public budget. "The objective, according to the multinational water companies, their governments, the IMF, the World Bank and the regional development banks, is to ensure, through the privatization of water or public-private agreements, access to related services for more than 2.4 billion people in the world. The "full universalization of the service", under this logic, is based on a private sector that by nature it is more efficient and competitive, as well as being able to provide the necessary financing. These assumptions, as Grusky of Public Citizen (USA) points out, "are not implemented in practice and are shown, among others, by the fiascos of? Buenos Aires, Manila, Atlanta, Cochabamba, England [since]? Have resulted in increases in the rates of water consumption, public health crises, weak regulations, lack of investment in water infrastructure. wealth, loss of jobs and threats to unions, pollution and other environmental catastrophes, or in secret agreements and social discontent "(18).
Now, the determination of the management and usufruct of the water contained in the Guaraní aquifer is defined in the base document of the World Bank indicated above, when it is stated that, "? The financing of the second phase will consider resources from cooperation agencies, GEF, WB, the private sector and / or other multi or bilateral financing organizations. " (19) That is to say, the Inter-American Development Bank - IDB, among others.
What is being talked about in the background, is to shape the national laws of the South American countries in question, so that they facilitate private investment programs on a strategic resource (understood as the endorsement of the Governments to transfer the management and use of water , even if it is only by way of "loan", or in legal words, of concession); a panorama in which the information on the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the resource (collected by the aforementioned SISAG) is essential to know the dimensions and potential of viable businesses. It is also striking that these scientific data will be available to the World Bank and its IFC, to the rest of the funders and surely to interested investors.
Although the aquifer project stands out due to the large amounts of fresh water contained therein, there are other projects of the same style in the region. It is worth mentioning those linked to the La Plata Basin (a nodal axis of the South American corridors of the Mercosur productive zone) that drains a quarter of the South American continent and covers an area of 3,100,000 km2. In this case, the program funded by the National Science Foundation - NSF (USA) called "Development of a Multidisciplinary Research Agenda in the La Plata Basin" stands out. It is part of the "Science for Sustainable Development" project of the International Programs Directory of the American Association for the Advancement of Science - AAAS (for its acronym in English), financed, among many, by various actors linked to a significant consumption of water such as Rockefeller (USA), Ford (USA), IBM (USA), Kellogg (USA), Kodak (USA) or Coca-Cola (USA). The latter, together with Nestlé (Switzerland) and Danone (France), leads the global bottled water business (20).
In itself, the Project, as in the case of the Guaraní aquifer and its SISAG, seeks to consolidate a more precise Geographic Information System (GIS) in the region, in order to "strengthen" and link "existing initiatives of the World Bank. , BID? ", Etcetera. (twenty-one)
The consolidation of control over these water reserves is particularly based on the perspective of their "conservation" and "sustainable use" (which, as indicated, for the World Bank and its partners generally means usufruct only by some candidates who meet with certain requirements that many times do not have much to do with environmental and conservation issues), but there is another dimension of the resource in terms of communications and power generation; I am referring to the location of waterways and hydroelectric plants, among other related infrastructures.
Added to the Paraguay-Paraná waterway is, for example, the "Grand Canal" that connects the Amazon system - and eventually the tributaries of the Paraná - with the Venezuelan coasts through the Orinoco River. This waterway must be viewed from the dynamics of the corridors as a direct exit to the Caribbean and to the US via the Mississippi. This is where a scenario of "dragging" of super giant bags with South American water towards the northern power (Florida) could take shape as an alternative or complement to the Aquarium scenario.
Another striking scheme is the network of dams that has been designed for the Chaco and Pampa region in Argentina, closely linked to promoting intensively irrigated agricultural production (read, agroindustry). Among the dams that are being considered are those of the Tarija-Bermejo System and the Polo de Desarrollo System; further southeast those of Paraná and Guazú; or a little more to the southwest those of Chocón, Cerros Colorados, Michihuao, Piedra del Agua, Alicurá and Collón Curá (see Map 2).
Other dams, more linked to their energy function as the basis of mining exploitation (particularly aluminum) have been considered for example in: Argentina (case of the dams to be located on the Cuervo, Cóndor and Blanco rivers for the benefit of the Canadian Noranda) ; Brazil's Amazon region (San Isabel, Serra Quebrada, Estreito and Machadinho dam, all benefiting Alcoa from the United States and other domestic companies such as Vale do Rio Doce or Votorantim); Chile (3 dams in Chacabuco to benefit Noranda); etc. (22)
Likewise, consider the hydroelectric potential of other regions such as Peru, a striking case if one takes into account that it is in that country where a large part of the Andean development corridor is located and where the main waterways (Sarameriza / Yurimaguas / Pucallpa ) of what IIRSA calls the "Amazon axis" - tributaries of the Amazon / Putumayo. The high energy consumption that the intensive operation of ports and neighboring industrial zones would imply could be supplied both with gas electricity generating plants from Camisea and / or with a few dozen hydroelectric plants. According to some calculations, the hydroelectric potential of the Marañón, Hullaga and Ucayali river basins could reach a combined power of about 18 thousand megawatts. (2. 3)
Similar scenarios of linkage between the IIRSA corridors and [its] "water corridors" extend throughout the Southern Cone. All require careful inquiries, particularly from local actors.
The dimensions of the ecological and social impacts and consequences that revolve around such potential scenarios for the management and usufruct of South American water within the framework of the IIRSA - the most spectacular ones briefly indicated here - therefore suggest that they are greater. The collective, open and participatory debate is urgent, especially because it is an issue that has and will surely have more and more importance, especially in the face of the growing tendency to privatize and denationalize the planet's natural resources. After all, water is vital for everyone, but it is not very clear that access to liquid is going to be, within such scenarios, effectively universal.
It is essential to realize that these projects (PPP, IIRSA and their "water corridors") will only operate where the population does not organize and fight collectively or where it stops doing so. And it is that social movements play a fundamental role not only as an expression of an affirmation of local identity, but above all as a reaction and countermeasure to a geoeconomic and geopolitical logic that supposes - in this case from the location of "development corridors" - the privatization, depredation and denationalization of natural resources. But note that it is not a question of rejecting all development plans, but of those that threaten the peoples and their natural environment; of those who, both in the water sphere and in others, seek to privatize benefits and socialize costs.
This article has been the product of research for a master's degree in Environmental Sciences at the Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology (Autonomous University of Barcelona) entitled "Political Ecology of Water".
Posted in Alternative Approaches. Argentina. July 2004.
* By Gian Carlo Delgado Ramos
Mexican economist graduated from the National Autonomous University of Mexico and doctoral candidate from the UAB. Author of The Biological Threat (Plaza and Janes, 2002) and Biodiversity, Sustainable Development and Militarization (Plaza and Valdés, 2004).
1- See: Worster, Donald. Rivers of Empire: water, aridity and the growth of the American West. Oxford University Press. 1985.
2- Read: Zinn, Howard. The other history of the United States. The other voices. Spain, 1999.
3- In general, large dam projects are linked to massive agro-industrial irrigation programs. In the world, around 65-70% of water consumption corresponds to agriculture, and the bulk of this to irrigation. The latter comprise about one sixth of the cultivated land, but contribute more than one third of the world harvest (Barlow, Maude and Clarke, Tony. Blue Gold. Sttodart. Canada, 2002: 6-9).
4- For an analysis of water within the framework of the PPP, see: Delgado-Ramos, Gian Carlo. "PPP, hydroelectricity and the environment." The Everyday. UAM. Mexico, January 2004.
5- Designed in 1964 by The Ralph M. Parsons Company, one of the largest engineering firms in the US, it is a multi-dam project in Alaska and the Yukon area of Canada that would trap water from several rivers in an area of about 3.36 million km2. Much of that water would later be channeled through an 800-km-long system built from the natural canyons of the Rocky Mountains in the Canadian province of British Columbia. From there, to the east a channel was defined to Lake Superior in order to keep the water level constant. This canal would increase the capacity for hydroelectric generation and the opening of new intensive agricultural fields throughout the Great Plain area of Canada and the United States, while enabling navigation from the Great Lakes to the heart of Alberta. Canada. To the south of the great reservoir of the Rockies, part of the water would be pumped towards the Sawtooth Reserve in southwest Montana, from which point it would be channeled - by gravity - towards the states of the central-east and southeast of the USA through a tunnel. that would cross Sawtooth Mountain about 24 m in diameter and 80 km long. Another part would be directed to the aqueducts that would carry the liquid to Oregon, Utah, Nevada, California and Arizona in the USA, and to part of Baja California, Chihuhua and Sonora in Mexico. And finally, the rest of the water from the Rockies reservoir would be used in a series of dams and treaters that would be located in central Idaho and southeastern Washington.
6- See: 1) Delgado-Ramos, Gian Carlo. "Privatization and Plunder of Water in Mesoamerica." New Society. No. 183. Venezuela, January-February 2003. 2) Delgado-Ramos, January 2004. Op cit.
7- Federal Executive Power. Secretariat of Social Development: National Urban Development Program 1995-2000. Mexico, March 1996.
8- The Aquarium scenario, would consist of an underground and / or marine aqueduct (so as not to lose a lot of water due to evaporation) that extends along the coastline of the Gulf of Mexico and bound for the USA; although the specifications may vary. The transfer of South American water to the extreme south, at some point in the Mexican state of Tabasco, could also follow the same path as that of the oil / gas pipelines leaving Colombia to a point close to the Ciudad PEMEX refinery center in Mexico. Once there, a sufficiently powerful pumping system would be required, which is why there is speculation of installations with exclusive power plants (which could include some nuclear power plants or other) and pumping substations linked to the main power line. The importance of the Usumacinta hydroelectric system, in addition to the energy that it would produce with the location of multiple hydroelectric plants, is that it would function as a regulated network in which the main flows of Mexico and Guatemala would be connected (plus the water that could be transferred from the rest of the Central America-Colombia by land or sea through the dragging of super-giant bags, a scenario that is not very feasible but not ruled out). This would serve as a large and extended "dam" to contain the liquid before it is pumped through the Aquarium stage (See: Delgado-Ramos, January 2004. Op cit).
9- According to the Statistical Review of World Energy 2003, Latin America and the Caribbean account, based on data from the end of 2002, with 10.6% of world oil reserves (86% concentrated in Venezuela and Mexico); produces 14.4% of crude; it has 4.7% of the proven international reserves of natural gas; with 2.3% of those of mineral coal -enough for 288 years-, and with 21.7% of the production of hydroelectricity in the world. Report available at: www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryld=95&contentld=2006480
10- See: http://iadb.org/cont/poli/yacyreta/admin.htm
11- A production of 110 million tons of soybeans is estimated in the area of influence, representing 50% of the volume of merchandise that is expected to be transported by this waterway. In this way, Brazil and Argentina together would surpass the USA, the "breadbasket of the world." To review some details of the project and its progress, see: a) text of the Bolivian Forum on the Environment available at www.fobomade.org.bo/index1.php. b) document of the IV Andean Port Colloquium held in October 2001: www.caata.gov.co/reuniones/coloquios/IVcoloportandino.doc
12- Read: Saxe-Fernández, John and Delgado Ramos, Gian Carlo. Imperialism and the World Bank. Popular. Spain, 2004.
13- BM. "Multilateral Initiative to manage South America’s largest groundwater reservoir launched." News Release No. 2003/371/LAC. Uruguay, 23 de mayo de 2003. Disponible en: http://web.worldbank.org Las negritas son mías.
14- BM, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development of the Guaraní Aquifer System. Reporte No. 23490-LAC. Washington, D.C. EUA, 17 de mayo de 2002. ( www.ana.gov.br/guarani/docsbasicos/pad.pdf)
15- Para la revisión particular del modus operandi de los proyectos del BM en Mesoamérica sobre conservación de biodiversidad véase: Delgado-Ramos, Gian Carlo. Biodiversidad, Desarrollo Sustentable y Militarización. Plaza y valdes. México, 2004.
16- Léase: Delgado-Ramos, enero-febrero de 2003. Op cit
17- En el marco de la reunión de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) celebrada en Cancún (México) en septiembre de 2003 se presionó la negociación de la privatización de servicios, que incluyen los del agua. El fracaso de la Cumbre presupone la posposición de la situación.
18- Véase Grusky, Sara. "Water privatization fiascos." Public Citizen. Marzo de 2003:1. Disponible en: www.citizen.org/cmep.
19- BM, mayo de 2002. Op cit.
20- El volumen de ventas de agua embotellada registró en el año 2000 unos 84 millardos de litros, de los cuales, una cuarta parte se consumía fuera de su país de origen. Para 2002 la cifra había aumentado a 126 millardos. Según Nestlé, en los próximos años, el crecimiento del sector deberá oscilar entre un 7% y un 9% al año, y el mercado deberá multiplicarse por dos en el 2010. Es un negocio redondo que se sustenta en la venta de un recurso vital y público que rara vez paga por la comercialización privada del mismo. Esto es que las multinacionales en el negocio se apropian del agua de los países donde se establecen. El negocio no es cualquiera, sobre todo si se considera que la cotización del agua embotellada es mayor que la del petróleo. A nivel mundial, el mercado del agua envasada está estimado en 22 millardos de dólares anuales. Para un estudio puntual de la temática véase: Delgado-Ramos, Gian Carlo. "El privilegiado y gran negocio del agua embotellada." El Catobeplas. 25. España, marzo de 2004. Disponible en: www.nodulo.org/ec/2004/n025p14.htm
22- Para una indagación puntual sobre esta temática véase el informe de Electrobras "Novas Usinas Hidroelectricas – 2001". Disponible en: www.eletrobras.gov.br/downloads/IN_Noticias_Assuntos/ usina_hidro01.pdf
23- Marañón 4,730 mw, Ucayali 8,360 mw y Huallaga 2,420 mw. (La Torre Tuesta y Lazarte Núñez. "Potencial hidroeléctrico de los ríos Marañón, Huallaga y Alto Ucayali." Cosapi. Perú. Sin fecha)